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Introduction
For more than three decades global microﬁnance services have been dominantly carried out by coalitions of
non-for-proﬁt organizations dedicated to providing opportunities for people in poverty to transform their lives
through small and micro business loans, training, and ﬁnancial services that enable them to develop and sus-
tain income-generating and job-creating enterprises. Most of them have been motivated by their vision and 
mission that include outreach - number of clients served, ﬁnancial viability - measured by the sustainability of
their programs and transformational impact - measurable impact on the lives of their clients.
Opportunity International (OI) is one of those global networks of microﬁnance institutions and funding part-
ners dedicated to achieve a triple bottom line of outreach, ﬁnancial viability and impact on their clients. In or-
der to better achieve its goals, as many other global coalitions, several years ago OI made a strategic decision 
to focus on creating regulated (formal) rather than unregulated (informal) microﬁnance institutions, including
conversion of those in existence, established through the years as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The primary reason for this orientation has been to overcome legal barriers and governance limitations inher-
ent in unregulated organizations which restrict outreach and access to capital. According to what the new 
concept afﬁrmed, the signiﬁcant outcomes should have been increased access to capital by regulated microﬁ-
nance institutions in a form of wholesale debt, deposits and investor equity, the ability to offer additional serv-
ices such as savings and insurance products, and the ability to attract investors that may not have otherwise 
participated. Given these advantages, it is projected that regulated microﬁnance institutions are able to reach
far greater number of poor micro-entrepreneurs while reducing dependency on donated funds.
“Microﬁnance in the 1990s has been marked by a major debate between two leading views: the ﬁnancial
systems approach and the poverty lending approach”, underlines Robinson. As the tendency for creating regu-
lated ﬁnancial institutions rather than historically preferred NGOs globally faces pro and contra argumentation,
the project proposes the rationale for conversion to be based on the particular experiences, as well as on 
qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed performances of nine East European MFIs: PShM (Albania), Nachala 
(Bulgaria), NOA (Croatia), Moznosti (Macedonia), OBM (Montenegro), Inicjatywa Mikro (Poland), OMRO (Ro-
mania), FORA (Russia) and OIS (Serbia). Although all members of OI Network each of these microﬁnance
entities belong to different social and legal environment, therefore being in different paths and phases of 
conversion.
Problem Description
About two decades after the time when “development academics, sponsored by USAID, were busy mounting 
an assault on the whole idea of subsidised development ﬁnance”, it is obvious that microﬁnance is becoming
more commercial worldwide. Not only are traditional nongovernmental organizations dedicated to microﬁ-
nance transforming into licensed banks and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries in order to access public funds
or small savings deposits, but some banks and ﬁnance companies are noticing the potential of micro-credit to
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enhance their own products.
“The early success of non-proﬁt grassroots organizations in serving this sector has led to two important
developments” says Jansson. “First, commercial banks, realizing that there might be a proﬁt to be made in
microﬁnance, are starting to pay serious attention to how they can serve this segment of the market. Second,
between grassroots non-proﬁt organizations and proﬁt-driven commercial banks, there is an emerging breed
of professional ﬁnancial institutions that specialize in microﬁnance. These are former non-proﬁt organizations
that have requested and received a license to operate as regulated and supervised ﬁnance companies or
banks”.
At the same time, credit unions are revitalizing themselves and seeking to regain their leading role as suppliers 
of full-range ﬁnancial services to the poor. Central Bank authorities and governments are examining whether
microﬁnance represents a feasible option for rescuing troubled stateowned development, agricultural, savings,
postal, trading and commercial banks. All of these organizations regard microﬁnance as a potentially viable
business, regardless of whether they are constituted as proﬁtmaximizing entities. An increasing number of
people in the ﬁeld regard commercialization as a necessary step to provide better quality ﬁnancial services to
the poor. “The microﬁnance revolution is a commercial revolution”, explains Robinson, simply opposing the
claims that “the winwin rhetoric promising poverty alleviation with proﬁts has moved far ahead of the evi-
dence”.
In that respect, when trying to analyse the tendencies that were preceding commercialization, two major 
causes can be easily recognised: declination of technical donor grants and an increased array of social invest-
ments funds, as well as bilateral and multilateral investments.
Namely, there is evidence in the past years that donors are getting tired of funding microﬁnance projects, for a
variety of reasons. First, they feel like they have invested a lot of money in this sector over the last decade, but 
have not seen any appreciable change in the rates of poverty. Second, they ﬁnd the risks in this ﬁeld very high.
While the industry has a few showcase success stories, it has many more examples of fraud and mismanage-
ment. Third, most of the donor governments are directing their foreign aid funds to deal with world’s urgent 
problems, leaving less money for microﬁnance. Unless something can be done to radically change donors’ per-
ceptions of the risks and rewards in this sector, it can be expected for this trend to continue. “Technical donor 
grant funding peaked in 1999/2000 at almost USD 1 billion for microﬁnance and small business development
programs. Amounts have been declining since 2000 and will be about USD 400 million in 2005”, says Vander 
Weele.
While donor funds are trending down over time, funds from government and social investment funds have 
greatly increased. “Major bilateral and multilateral investment entities report increasing commitment to micro 
and small business ﬁnancing, from USD 600 million in 2000 to almost USD 1 billion per year”, while CGAP re-
ports that social investment funds will grow from about USD 100 million in 2003 to USD 200 million by 2006.
In addition, many local governments are also providing loans to microﬁnance organizations, often with funds
that come from the World Bank. It is now much easier to borrow funds than to get a grant. The International 
Finance Corporation is emerging as a key gatekeeper and a leader in this investment arena for microﬁnance.
Beyond these sources, the next huge wave of investment funds could come from commercial investors who 
ﬁnd microﬁnance to be a stable investment.
In that sense, the other path in the process of commercialization of the microﬁnance industry is seen with
more full scale banks entering into the market through downscaling of their operations. The bottom-line in 
microﬁnance is that there is money in it. It is seen in a way that there is money to be made in microﬁnance,
that microﬁnance is good for the business, and what is good for the business should also be good for the
community.
Non-governmental organizations have been working in the area of microﬁnance for many years. As said, they
are starting to formalize because they have found out that the type of services that they provide to the poor 
and other marginalized groups, are insufﬁcient. Only by formalizing can they go into a deposit-taking mode
and offer other services for which the micro-entrepreneurs that have progressed to a certain level are in need 
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of. Therefore, the primary reason for this strategy is to overcome legal barriers and governance limitations 
inherent in unregulated organizations which restrict outreach and access to capital, also not forgetting the 
“limitations of the NGO modality arising from the lack of owners”.
The signiﬁcant outcomes of this approach are increased access to capital in the form of wholesale debt, de-
posits and investor equity, the ability to offer additional services such as savings and insurance products, and 
the ability to attract investors that may not have otherwise participated. Given these advantages, regulated 
microﬁnance institutions are able to reach far greater numbers of the poor while reducing dependency on
donated funds.
Yet, while focused on the rationale for conversion, various authors develop their own argumentation. White 
and Campion, for example, note that “the desire to join the ﬁnancial system is a reﬂection of many microﬁ-
nance NGOs’ twin goals of reducing donor dependence and exponentially increasing the number of clients 
with access to microﬁnance”. For Rosengard the main reason for an NGO to become a regulated ﬁnancial
institution has been to achieve long-term sustainability, via a combination of the following factors: 
• Growth in the scale and scope of operations, which in turn increases the magnitude of development im-
pact while reducing operational costs and diversifying operational risks;
• Access to funds, whether in the form of local voluntary savings, large investor deposits, inter-bank loans, 
or capital market debt or equity, which decreases funding dependency and uncertainty while increasing 
capital leverage and the scope for business expansion;
• Improved governance and operations, usually the result of regulations regarding ownership composition, 
management standards, prudential norms, and accounting and reporting requirements; and
• Enhanced customer service, in the form of a wider range of products and delivery systems, together with 
the increased likelihood of developing a long-term banking relationship for savings, credit, and other 
ﬁnancial services.
Similar approach has been taken by Campion. She lists, namely, ﬁve short objectives of conversion:
• Access to commercial capital;
• Expand client outreach;
• Offer savings products;
• Improve customer service;
• Improve governance and accountability through private sector ownership.
So, based on the referred classiﬁcations, one overall view might deﬁne three major elements that are backing
the rationale for NGO conversion:
• Meeting demand for credit. As an NGO, MFI is unable to expand at the desired rate to meet demand 
for credit, even if that is part of the original NGO mandate. There is a need for additional ﬁnancing to
expand services, including the need for obtaining funds to increase its loan portfolio. At the same time, 
ﬁnancing of the NGO faces decrease while the demand is increasing faster than funds are arriving;
• Capturing savings. It is known that NGOs are restricted from using client’s savings, commercial debt, 
shareholder investments and loans from the Central Bank for the purpose of ﬁnancing, which means
that they are legally restricted from offering full ﬁnancial services to their clients. In addition, in some
countries there is a problem with inﬂation and saving in banks can offer security on the value of clients’
funds;
• Launching market driven approach. Some NGOs want to create market-driven approach to micro-lend-
ing. By paying for its funds through interest on savings deposits, dividends, inter-bank loans and other 
means available to regulated ﬁnancial institutions, converted NGOs could accomplish expansion, be
market driven and be independent from the donated funds. NGO might be sustainable but signiﬁcant
expansion calls for more funds. In this way, they are solving long-term economic challenge, serving 
clients not beneﬁciaries and funding programs though investors not donors.
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Policy Options
Based on what has been offered in the previous sections of this paper, both as theoretical and empirical ar-
gumentation, it is hard to deny that NGOs conversion into FFIs has positive impact on what has been drafted 
as general objective of the microﬁnance industry for the next decade. As a matter of fact, there are still views
that “this development in the NGO micro-credit sub-sector is ironic because NGOs began micro-credit provi-
sion initially because of the failure of RFIs, commercial banks in particular, to serve the poor and low-income 
households”, but this kind of divisions, among other into institutionists and welfarists seem to be completely 
outdated.
Yet, what is seen after examining the nine OI partners is some sort of competition among institutions. Gener-
ally, as everywhere else, competition is seen as good for the consumer - competition in industry has improved 
service quality, driven innovations, and brought about new ways of doing things.
In that sense, the performances indicated in the previous sections of this paper show that in many cases there 
is no compulsory relationship between MFI’s success, as broadly understood notion, and its formal/informal 
status. Measurable by performance indicators available, within the nine MFIs examined in this paper there are 
examples of successful NGOs, co-operative, savings houses/banks and a full service bank. On the other side, 
although a very exact activity, provision of microﬁnance services might be never successful enough for the
ultimate goal of the whole concept which is to eradicate poverty over the globe. In that respect, it is not easy 
to determine how much the conversion itself contributed to the level of particular success. Namely, some politi-
cal and economic developments in particular countries inﬂuence the success. Speciﬁc regulator’s requirements
have their own inﬂuence, therefore making the skilfulness and wisdom - by which the conversion process Is
guided - to be important but not the decisive factor.
The number of clients served seems to be the most useful indicator for the purpose of illustration of this 
dilemma. Eight of nine of the examined MFIs, both regulated and unregulated, have continuous increase of 
this parameter. Even more, the highest rate (48%) of client growth in 2004 has been performed by a ﬁnance
company (PShM - Albania), while both a full service bank (OBM - Montenegro) and the only NGO in this group 
of nine (FORA - Russia) in the same period accomplished similar client growth of 28-29%. These ﬁndings
therefore make this indicator not very relevant to the subject of this research.
Additional indicator of the success of the MFI is the increase of the portfolio. As with the client outreach indica-
tors, the willingness of the investors, including those with social motivation, is highly dependent not only on 
the institutional status of the MFI, but also on the political and economic situation in the particular country. In 
that sense, decrease in performance ﬁgures sometimes has been caused by wider economic or political crisis,
unfair competition, organizational weakness, changes in the management etc. rather than the poor perform-
ance of the MFI caused by its regulated/unregulated status.
In the similar manner, increase in performance ﬁgures sometimes has been caused by external factors (new
grant, if portfolio is concerned), rather than the excellence in performance. Implementation of complementary 
step (increase of the number of clients as a consequence of downgrading the average loan size) might also 
lead to misleading conclusions.
In that sense, if the need for strong performance is taken as crucial reason for conversion, Russian FORA de-
nies that stand also in another area - loan portfolio quality: with the number of clients being almost tripled in 
three years, portfolio in arrears more than 1 day (!) has been kept on 0.4%. As said, these results have been 
achieved as an NGO and are the leading ones within the whole OI Network.
Another argumentation in favour of the stand of conditional relevance of the formal status for the perform-
ance can be found in the two cooperatives’ case: current difﬁculties and modest performance of NOA (Croatia)
namely, have little to do with their institutional status, but are result of a speciﬁc problem with the Croatian
tax legislation. At the same time, the other co-operative (Nachala - Bulgaria) performs very well, attracting 
continuous grant funding from USAID. Nachala namely, was the only one of the microﬁnance institutions in
Bulgaria to receive an expansion grant, which is the direct result of an extremely positive and complimentary 
evaluation, conducted by an independent consulting ﬁrm engaged by USAID.
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An interesting characterization, related not only to performance ﬁgures but also to the governance challenges,
applies to Moznosti (Macedonia). Being FFI (savings house/bank since 2000) but at the same time being 
refused upon application for full service bank, Moznosti kept excellent performance. Even more, a year after 
refusal, Moznosti has been given highest possible grade for FFI in the country by the very same authority 
(Central Bank). All this happened with exactly the same governing board and management that were running 
Moznosti as NGO.
Polish and Romanian (IM and OMRO) cases, on the other hand, might be good examples in supporting the 
conversion logic. Both non-deposit taking ﬁnance companies, they are in relative stagnation caused mainly by
the lack of funds. Although it is said that there are no present plans to convert them into banks, their current 
status might be a good reason to believe that as FFIs they would have done much better with the attraction of 
capital. Certainly, good will for conversion cannot be enough as some other open questions are to be analysed 
and solved ﬁrst: capacity to attract the capital, unfavourable legislation (high level of capital required for bank
establishment), strong competition on the market, etc.
Finally, the textbook example of the right time decision to convert (right after the new banking law has been 
passed, with the new Montenegrin Central Bank just established), altogether with the right method and the 
right people put in place, has been that of the OBM (Montenegro). It is a case that justiﬁes all previously listed
objectives of the conversion. OBM’s results to date, namely, offer a dramatic example of the potential scope 
and scale of outreach and coverage if microﬁnance is done in a sustainable manner through a commercial
bank. Even more, fears that a commitment to sustainability (proﬁt) virtually guarantees that an MFI will move
up market, abandoning poorer clients, in this case have appeared ungrounded. In fact, contrary to the critics of 
commercialization who frequently note that the average loan size of commercialized microﬁnance institutions
is signiﬁcantly higher than that of non-proﬁt MFIs, OBM’s ﬁgure raised reasonably, at the end of 2004 being at 
an acceptable (for European standards) level of 4,486 USD.
This does not mean again, that the success of OBM is a direct consequence of the conversion itself. As argued 
in various sections of this paper, conversion is doing a lot but not doing it all. In that sense, this paper does 
not suggest to “disregard [the] microﬁnance evangelists proselytizing one way of doing business”. What this
paper is advocating for is to be careful with the expectations from the conversion itself. It is not a panacea. 
Competition among institutions and “one size does not ﬁt all” logic will sustain for at least some time in the
future, and if regulated microﬁnance institutions are not going to be regarded as an end in themselves, they
are now in the best position to prove their advantages.
